转发美国三部门联合发布的“征求公众就F/RAND承诺的标准基本专利许可谈判和补救措施政策声明草案发表意见”的通知
(以下为通知原文)
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The Department of Justice announced today that it is requesting public comment on a new draft policy statement concerning standards-essential patents (SEPs) that seeks to promote good-faith licensing negotiations and addresses the scope of remedies available to patent owners that have agreed to license their essential technologies on reasonable and non-discriminatory or fair, reasonable,and non-discriminatory (F/RAND) terms.The Justice Department worked with U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in responding to President Biden’s recent Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, which encouraged the agencies to review the 2019 Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments to ensure that it adequately promoted competition.Together the agencies,after consulting with the Federal Trade Commission,are now issuing a revised draft statement for public comment.
“The department looks forward to working with our agency partners,” said Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “We are committed to taking a principled, transparent, and balanced approach at the intersection of intellectual property and antitrust law.”
The draft statement is open to public comment for 30 days and provides a framework to facilitate good-faith licensing negotiation between SEP owners and potential licensees. It also discusses what remedies may be available when SEPs subject to voluntary F/RAND commitments are infringed.The draft statement indicates that good-faith negotiation that leads to widespread and efficient licensing between SEP holders and those who seek to implement standardized technologies can help to promote technology innovation, further consumer choice,and enable industry competitiveness. The draft statement will not be finalized until the agencies consider all stakeholder input.
In particular, the agencies are interested in comments addressing the following questions:Should the 2019 Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments be revised?
Does the draft revisedstatement appropriately balance the interests of patent holders and implementers in the voluntary consensus standards process, consistent with the prevailing legal framework for assessing infringement remedies?
Does the draft revised statement address the competition concerns about the potential for extension of market power beyond appropriate patent scope identified in the July 9.2021 Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy?
In your experience, has the possibility of injunctive relief been a significant factor in negotiations over SEPs subject to a voluntary F/RAND commitment? If so, how often have you experienced this?
Are other challenges typically present in negotiating a SEP license? If so, what information should be provided or exchanged as a practical matter to make negotiation more efficient and transparent?
Are small business owners and small inventors impacted by perceived licensing inefficiencies involving SEPs? If so, how can licensing be made more efficient and transparent for small businesses and small inventors that either own, or seek to license, SEPs?
Will the licensing considerations set forth in the draft revised Statement promote a useful framework for good-faith F/RAND licensing negotiations? In what ways could the framework be improved?How can any framework for good-faith negotiations, and this framework in particular, better support the intellectual property rights policies of standards-setting organizations?
What other impacts, if any, would the draft revised statement have on standards-setting organizations and contributors to the standards development process?
The draft revised statement discusses fact patterns intended to indicate when a potential licensee is willing or unwilling to take a F/RAND license. Are there other examples of willingness or unwillingness that should be included in the statement?
Have prior executive branch policy statements on SEPs been used by courts, other authorities, or in licensing negotiations? If so, what effect has the use of those statements had on the licensing process, outcomes, or resolutions?
Are there resources or information that the U.S. government could provide/develop to help inform businesses about licensing SEPs subject to a voluntary F/RAND commitment?
Interested parties，including attorneys，economists，academics， consumer groups，industry stakeholders or other members of the public may submit public comments to Regulations.gov until Jan.5. 2022.Information about the draft revised statement can also be found on the Antitrust Division’s website.
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参考翻译：
希望着重提供反馈意见的问题：
1. 2019年关于受自愿F/RAND承诺约束的标准必要专利补救措施的政策声明是否应该修订?
2. 修订后的声明草案是否适当平衡了自愿协商一致标准过程中专利持有人和实施者的利益，符合评估侵权补救措施的现行法律框架?
3. 草案修订的声明是否涉及竞争的关注，关于市场权力延伸的潜力超过2021年7月9日行政命令中确定的关于促进美国经济竞争的适当专利范围吗?
4. 根据您的经验，禁令救济的可能性是否是受自愿F/RAND承诺约束的SEP谈判中的一个重要因素?如果是，你多久经历一次?
5. 在谈判SEP许可证时，通常存在其他挑战吗?如果是的话，作为一个实际问题，应该提供或交换哪些信息，以使谈判更加有效和透明?
6. 小企业主和小发明家是否受到涉及SEP的许可证低效率的影响?如果是这样，对于拥有或寻求许可SEP的小企业和小发明家，如何提高许可的效率和透明度?
7. 修订声明草案中提出的许可事项是否会促进诚信F/RAND许可谈判的有用框架?可以通过哪些方式改进该框架?任何诚信谈判框架，尤其是该框架，如何更好地支持标准制定组织的知识产权政策?
8. 修订后的声明草案会对标准制定组织和标准制定过程的参与者产生哪些其他影响(如有)?
9. 修订后的声明草案讨论了旨在表明潜在被许可人何时愿意或不愿意获得F/RAND许可证的事实模式。声明中是否还应包括其他愿意或不愿意的例子?
10. 法院、其他当局或许可证谈判中是否使用了先前行政部门关于SEP的政策声明?如果是，这些声明的使用对许可过程、结果或决议有什么影响?
11. 美国政府是否可以提供/开发资源或信息，以帮助企业了解根据自愿F/RAND承诺许可?
